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Abstract
This paper explores the empirical relevance of banking market structure on
growth. There is substantial evidence of a positive relationship between the
level of development of the banking sector of an economy and its long-run out-
put growth. Little is known, however, about the role played by the market
structure of the banking sector on the dynamics of capital accumulation. This
paper provides evidence that bank concentration promotes the growth of those
industrial sectors that are more in need of external nance by facilitating credit
access to younger rms. However, we also nd evidence of a general depressing
eect on growth associated with a concentrated banking industry, which impacts
all sectors and all rms indiscriminately.The importance of nancial development for economic growth has been extensively an-
alyzed in recent years. The amount of credit that the banking sector makes available
for productive uses is one of the most signicant measures of nancial development.
Such an indicator of size of the banking sector has been shown to have a signicant,
positive eect on growth. In this paper we study whether for a given size, the mar-
ket structure of the banking sector has empirical relevance for economic growth. If it
is agreed that size is important to capital accumulation, does it matter whether the
underlying industry structure is unconcentrated, thus approximating perfectly compet-
itive conditions, or whether instead market power is concentrated among few banking
institutions?
We nd that concentration in the banking sector promotes the growth of those
industries that are more in need of external nance by facilitating credit access to
rms, especially younger ones. However, we also nd evidence of a general deadweight
loss associated with banking market concentration (i.e., aecting all industrial sectors
indiscriminately), which instead depresses growth.
We believe there are theoretical reasons, as well as anecdotal evidence, suggesting
that the market structure of the banking sector has a non-trivial impact on the process
of capital accumulation. Conventional wisdom suggests that any departure from per-
fect competition in the credit market introduces ineciencies that would harm rms'
access to credit, thus impacting negatively on growth. Pagano [23], for example, shows
this eect in a simple endogenous growth model. On the other hand, some recent
contributions have pointed out that banks with monopoly power have a greater in-
centive to establish lending relationships with their client rms, thus facilitating their
access to credit lines. Mayer [20, 21] and Petersen and Rajan [24] highlight this poten-
tial incompatibility between bank competition and the establishment of close lending
relationships.
There is some historical evidence on the positive role of concentrated credit markets
1for economic development. Gerschenkron [15], for example, mentions the importance
of institutions such as the Credit Mobilier for the industrialization of France, or that
of the Great Banks for Germany's development. Cohen [11] explains the similar role
played by Banca Commerciale Italiana and Credito Italiano for Italy, two banks whose
combined assets accounted for about 60 percent of the total market. Likewise, Sylla
[29] argues that monopoly-enhancing regulation in the nancial sector at the time
of the Civil War contributed to industrialization in the United States. By the same
token, Mayer [21] mentions how Japan's post-war development has been boosted by
their main-bank system.
While the arguments on both sides of this theoretical debate are compelling, no
broad-scope, cross-country empirical study has been conducted to test either stance.
Yet the normative implications regarding the regulation of the banking industry are
clearly of central importance to policy-making, a fact which provides a primary moti-
vation for our study. In this paper we choose to take an agnostic position on the issue
in order to explore the consistency of each theory with the available data.1
This paper contributes to the recent line of empirical research on nancial inter-
mediation and growth. Following the original contributions by Goldsmith [16], Gurley
and Shaw [17], McKinnon [22] and Shaw [28], economists in recent years have returned
to this problem. Among the newer contributions, King and Levine [18] present the
rst broad, cross-country analysis of the importance of various indicators of nancial
development. They nd that countries initially endowed with a more sizeable credit
1Petersen and Rajan [24] present some indirect empirical evidence analyzing credit availability for
a cross-section of U.S. small businesses located in markets characterized by dierent degrees of bank
concentration. They nd that in more concentrated banking markets rms are less credit constrained,
and younger rms are charged lower loan rates. Shaer [27], on the other hand, nds evidence on
cross-sectional U.S. data that household income grows faster in markets with a higher number of
banks. Our analysis diers from these contributions for the following reasons. First, we perform
a cross-country study. Second, while the authors worked in a cross-sectional dimension, we also
exploit cross-industry variability to better identify the eects of bank market power on growth. In
addition, as we describe in greater detail in the paper, we also explore the role of the government
in the banking sector, the impact of regulatory constraints on banks, market contestability and the
relationship between bank concentration and industry concentration.
2sector experienced faster growth in the following thirty years. Also using cross-country
regression analysis, Levine and Zervos [19] make an important renement by show-
ing the joint, independent relevance for growth of both banks and capital markets.
Meanwhile, Rajan and Zingales [25] render an innovative contribution to the eld by
using a cross-industry, cross-country data set. First, they construct a measure of the
dependence on external nance of a wide range of industrial sectors, in which dif-
ferences among sectors depend mainly on technology-specic factors.2 Second, they
test whether industries that are more dependent on external nance grow faster in
countries that are more nancially developed. They nd that this is indeed the case,
thus providing evidence conrming the overall importance of nancial development on
growth.
Our paper uses the same methodological approach as Rajan and Zingales to test the
importance of banking market structure for growth. We ask the following question:
for a given level of development of the banking sector, what is the impact of bank
concentration on industries' demand for external funding, and consequently, on their
growth? Given the opposing theoretical views described earlier, the answer to this
question is not obvious. On the one hand, if bank concentration simply results in lower
credit availability, then one should expect that rms in sectors especially dependent
on external nance should suer more, and therefore grow less, when faced with a
concentrated banking sector. On the other hand, if bank concentration enhances the
formation of lending relationships, then one should expect that precisely those rms
in industries especially dependent on external nance should benet more when faced
with a concentrated banking sector. We therefore test whether industries that are
highly dependent on external nance will grow relatively slower or faster in countries
where the banking sector is more concentrated.
2For example, an industrial sector at high R&D intensity is expected to rely more on external
sources of nance than other, more traditional, sectors (e.g. Computing or Chemical products as
opposed to Tobacco or Leather).
3More precisely, corporate nance theory suggests that rms relative age may aect
their dependence on external nance. For example, Rajan and Zingales show that,
in median terms, U.S. rms raise a positive amount of external nance only up to
the tenth year of their life. Therefore, one would expect to nd stronger evidence of
either eect of bank concentration by focusing the analysis specically on the external
nancial needs of younger rms. Since the Rajan and Zingales data set provides
separate information on rms less than ten years old and on the more mature ones, we
are able to do that. Therefore, our empirical test is: all else equal, do industries whose
younger rms are especially dependent on external nance grow more or less rapidly
in countries where the banking sector is highly concentrated? The results, based on
cross-country, cross-industry regression analysis, show robust evidence that industries
in which young rms are more dependent on external nance will in fact grow relatively
faster in those countries where the banking sector is more concentrated.
However, our empirical study does not end with the analysis of the eects of the
interaction between bank concentration and rms' dependence on external nance.
In contrast to Rajan and Zingales, we also evaluate a rst-order eect of bank con-
centration on industry growth. Regardless of particular characteristics of rms and
industrial sectors, we ask whether concentration per se has, on average, a positive or
negative eect on growth.3 We nd that such eect depresses growth in all sectors
indiscriminately.
The two results are not in contradiction. On the contrary, taken together they
allow us to conrm the basic predictions of both theories of banking market structure
and growth: a more concentrated banking industry imposes a deadweight loss in the
credit market, resulting in a reduction in the total quantity of loanable funds, exactly
as conventional wisdom would suggest. However, subjecting to more careful scrutiny
3Rajan and Zingales did not really need to test the rst-order eect of nancial development, since
this is what all other cross-country contributions had thoroughly analyzed before.
4the complexity of the microeconomic relationship between rms' nancial needs and
sources of nance, we also nd evidence that the eect is heterogeneous across industrial
sectors, and that in fact specic categories of rms and industries seem to benet from
a concentrated banking sector.
In the next section we describe in more detail the theory behind our empirical study.
Section 2 and 3 contain the illustration of the two models used for hypothesis testing.
In section 4 we describe the data set. The results for the basic model specication are
presented in section 5, while section 6 contains a battery of robustness tests. Section 7
presents the results for the extended model, where we estimate the rst-order eect of
bank concentration. In section 8 we present various renements of the analysis, while
section 9 elaborates on the several policy implications associated with the results of
our investigation and presents concluding remarks.
1 Theoretical background
The negative eect of banking market power is a direct application of standard results
from market theory. Banks with monopoly power would determine, with respect to
perfect competition, an equilibrium with higher loan rates and a smaller quantity
of loanable funds. This would clearly reduce economic growth. The positive eect
derives, as we mentioned above, from the greater incentive for monopolistic banks
to establish lending relationships, which in turn promotes rms' access to investment
funds. According to the model developed in Petersen and Rajan [24], a bank will
establish lending relationships with young rms with no record of performance, thus
bearing initial informational costs, if it can share in their future stream of prots,
should they turn out to be successful. However, in highly competitive credit markets,
a bank knows that it may not be able to maintain a tie with the successful rms:
once these rms are established they will seek the lowest-cost supply of credit available
5in the market. Banks that did not invest initial resources in funding the unknown
rms would have a cost advantage in oering better credit conditions than the bank
attempting to recoup the original cost. In the presence of this free-riding problem,
competition in banking can induce credit rationing in the sense that potentially high
quality, but young and unknown, entrepreneurs may not get funded.
This theoretical argument is implicitly based on an assumption of market incom-
pleteness. For example, a possible solution to the free-riding problem under competi-
tion would be to allow banks to hold equity positions. Under this scenario, the bank
would participate in future prot sharing regardless of whether the rm maintains a
lending relationship. In fact, one can argue that monopoly power gives the bank an
implicit equity stake in the rm it is nancing. Regulatory restrictions, however, may
prevent a bank from writing equity contracts. We explore how the degree of regula-
tory restrictions aect the empirical relationship between banking market power and
industrial growth in section 8.
2B a s i c M o d e l
The rst model we test empirically extends the Rajan and Zingales specication. We
write our basic growth equation as,
Growthj;k = Constant + 1  Country Indicators (1)
+ 2  Industry Indicators
+ 3  Industry share of manufacturing value addedj;k
+ 4  (External dependencej  Bank developmentk)
+ 5  (External dependencej  Bank concentrationk)
+ Errorj;k;
6where a subscript j indicates that the variable refers to the j-th industry. Similarly, a
subscript k indicates a variable regarding the k-th country. Bold coecients indicate
vectors.
The indicator variables correct for country- and industry-specic characteristics,
thus allowing the isolation of any eect specically associated with the development
of the banking sector and, more importantly for us, its market structure.
The j industries in the data set all belong to manufacturing.4 Similar to the role
played by income per capita in standard cross-country growth equations, the industry j
share of total value added in manufacturing in country k, calculated at the beginning
of the period, captures the so-called \convergence" eect: sectors that have already
grown substantially in the past are unlikely to continue to grow at a high rate in the
future. Therefore, 3 is expected to have a negative sign.
External dependence measures the external nancial needs of rms in a specic
industry j. As anticipated in the introduction, we focus on the external nancial
needs of younger rms (those less than 10 years old). For comparison, we also present
results regarding more mature rms.
The Rajan and Zingales conjecture predicts a positive sign for 4: industries more
in need of external funding will grow faster in countries with a more developed banking
sector.
Finally, we add the interaction between external nancial dependence and bank
concentration. The focus of our empirical exploration is on the sign and signicance
of 5. As we mentioned above, theory suggests that there are two opposing eects on
growth that we can associate with bank concentration. Therefore, the sign of 5 is
a priori ambiguous. In fact, one cannot rule out a priori the possibility that the two
theoretical eects, although both existing, may actually cancel each other out, and
4As Rajan and Zingales note, this is done \...in order to reduce the dependence on country-specic
factors, like natural resources..." ([25, p. 567]).
7thus encourage, in the event of statistically non-signicant ndings, a false rejection
of the model. This is a potential problem for our analysis, since we would be unable
to discern whether a non-signicant nding should be interpreted as the result of two
opposing eects, or whether we should conclude that bank concentration simply does
not have any eect on the growth of specic categories of rms and sectors.5
Keeping this remark in mind, any nding of signicance of 5, whether positive or
negative, should be interpreted as a strong nding in favor of either theoretical stance.
3 Extended model
The approach we have outlined so far enables us to identify an interaction eect of bank
concentration with the external nancing needs of younger rms. Such analysis does
not allow us to learn about a possible rst-order, direct eect of bank concentration
on growth, that is, the eect that would result from including in equation (1) the level
of bank concentration by itself.
It is possible that the negative eect of bank concentration would impact all rms
in all sectors of production, regardless of rms' age or their degree of dependence from
external funding. Therefore, the simultaneous estimation of both the rst-order eect
of bank concentration and the interaction with external nancial dependence is an
attempt to identify simultaneously the two separate eects.
The drawback of this procedure, however, is that bank concentration varies among
countries but obviously has no variability across industries within a country. There-
fore we cannot identify the direct eect using the specication of equation (1), which
includes country indicator variables. In order to allow identication, and at the same
time reduce the impact of country-specic eects, we modify the basic model by re-
moving the country indicator variables and replacing them with a vector of control
5It is worth noting, however, that even this second conclusion would have policy implications.
8variables customarily used in cross-country growth studies.
The extended model specication is as follows:
Growthj;k = Constant + γ1  Industry Indicators (2)
+ γ2  Controlsk
+ γ3  Industry share of manufacturing value addedj;k
+ γ4  Bank developmentk
+ γ5  (External dependencej  Bank developmentk)
+ γ7  Bank concentrationk
+ γ8  (External dependencej  Bank concentrationk)
+ Errorj;k:
In this extended specication of the model we have included the level of bank concen-
tration, as well as the level of bank development. We focus on the sign and magnitude
of both γ7 and γ8. The vector of country control variables is described in greater detail
in the presentation of the empirical results.
4D a t a
The empirical analysis relies on our augmented version of the Rajan and Zingales data
set.6 The sample includes 41 countries and for each of them 36 industries, yielding a
remarkably large sample size. The 36 industries, as mentioned earlier, are all selected
from the manufacturing sector. The relevant growth variable is the average (com-
pounded) rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each country
between 1980 and 1990.
6The data set was kindly made available by the authors.
9Rajan and Zingales calculate the measure of external nancial dependence for each
industry for U.S. sectors, arguing that the \dependence of U.S. rms on external nance
[is] a good proxy for the demand for external funds in other countries" (see Rajan and
Zingales [25, pp. 563{65] for details). The measure of bank development in their data
set is the commonly used ratio between domestic credit to the private sector and GDP.
As we proceed in the description of the empirical results, we will introduce and describe
additional variables used for robustness tests (all variables are summarized in Table
2).
We augment the data set to include indicators of concentration of the banking
sector. Specically, for each country we calculate the sum of market shares (mea-
sured in total assets) of the three and of the ve largest banks. The data source is
the IBCA-BankScope 1997 CD, which contains detailed balance sheet information on
individual banking institutions for the period 1989{1996. For each country we have
then computed the concentration ratios for every year in the sample for which there
was exhaustive information (for some countries in some years, not all bank balance
sheets were reported, thus making the computation unreliable). For each country we
have then computed averages over time, which constitute our measures of bank con-
centration. Table 1 contains the list of countries in the data set and the corresponding
indicators of bank concentration.
We were unable to nd data going back earlier than 1989. Since the growth variable
refers to the decade 1980{1990, we are exposed to the potential problems that an ex-
post variable could generate, such as endogeneity. However, we are condent that in
this case the ex-post determination does not constitute an important issue. First, the
market structure of the banking sector, at the country level, does not vary substantially
over such a short time period. We checked this prior by analyzing for each country the
pattern of variability of the concentration ratios calculated for the 1989{1996 period.
We found that indeed such ratios are remarkably stable over time. For example, we
10calculated the range for the 3-bank concentration ratio in each country. The cross-
country median range of variation in the 1989{1996 period was only 3 percentage
points. Even more telling, in about 70 percent of the countries (27 out of 41) the 3-bank
ratio had a variation over time of less than 5 percentage points.7 To our knowledge,
there are no reasons to believe that such stability over the 1989{1996 period should
not also be found in the contiguous 1980{1990 period.
Second, we follow the suggestion of Cameron [9], McKinnon [22] and Shaw [28], also
highlighted in Bencivenga and Smith [4], that dierences across countries in the market
structure of the credit sector seem to depend primarily on legislation and government
regulation. While government regulation of the nancial sector certainly adjusts to
economic conditions, it seems plausible that rigidities and lags in policy response make
the assumption of exogeneity of the banking market structure acceptable in our case.
We also present a test of endogeneity in section 8.
We also constructed the series of the rank of the 3-bank and the 5-bank concentra-
tion ratios. In other words, we allow for the possibility that the averages calculated over
the 1989{1996 period are possibly dierent from the ones we would have calculated
for the 1980{1990 period, but we require that countries keep their relative position
in the ranking. This is a less stringent condition than requiring that concentration
ratios remained unchanged. Finally, we calculate an indicator variable (high-low con-
centration) as an additional alternative to our 3-bank and 5-bank ratios. Following
the above reasoning, even though the actual values of concentration in the earlier pe-
riod may have been dierent from our indices, and perhaps some rankings may have
changed as well, as long as the range of variation was not so large to make a country
shift from the high to the low concentration cluster (or vice versa), a concentration
indicator constructed on 1989{1996 averages is very likely to be similar to the one we
7As a term of comparison, the cross-country average 3-bank ratio in our sample is approximately
55 percent.
11would have constructed for the 1980{1990 period, had the data been available. In the
empirical analysis we test the robustness of the results to the use of this alternative
measures of market structure.
5 Empirical results from the basic model
Table 4 reports in column (a) the results of the basic Rajan and Zingales specication,
here reported as a benchmark, and then in column (b) the results for equation (1), using
the 3-bank ratio as indicator of bank concentration. In both regressions the dependent
variable is the average growth in value added for each sector in each country, and
external nancial dependence is that of the younger rms in the data set. Unless
otherwise noted, the dependent variable and the indicator of external nance will
remain the same in all of the following regressions.
In the rst regression, as expected, the share of total value added in manufacturing
is negative and signicant, and the interaction between external dependence and bank
development is positive and signicant. In the second regression, the coecients of
these variables maintain the same sign and signicance. In addition, the coecient
of the interaction between external nancial dependence and bank concentration is
positive and signicant at the ve percent level. In view of the discussion presented
in section 2 regarding the potential cancelling out of two opposing eects of bank
concentration, this nding suggests that the positive eect must be relatively strong.
This result indicates that the positive impact of bank concentration on growth is not
uniform across industries: some will benet more than others. Consequently, bank
concentration has an important redistributive eect across industries. We elaborate
further on this point and the related policy implications in the following sections.
In order to gauge the economic signicance of the bank concentration variable,
we perform a standard comparative dynamics exercise. Specically, we calculate the
12growth dierential between an industrial sector at the 75th percentile and one at the
25th percentile of the distribution of external nancial dependence for younger rms,
if we were going from a country at the 25th percentile of the distribution of bank
concentration to a country at the 75th percentile. The growth dierential eect is
estimated to be about 1.2 percentage points on an annual basis.8 Considering that
the average growth over all sectors is 3.6 percent (see Table 2), this eect is actually
rather large.
6 Robustness tests
6.1 Do the results depend on the choice of the concentration
indicator?
We rst check whether the 3-bank ratio calculated over the 1989{1996 period is an
adequate indicator of concentration. In column (c) of Table 4, the concentration indi-
cator is the rank of the 3-bank ratio, while in column (d) is the high-low concentration
dummy for the 3-bank ratio.9 In column (e) we use the 5-bank ratio, to check that
the results would not depend on the arbitrary choice of computing the concentration
indicator as the sum of the market shares of the top three banks only. The strong
similarity of the results obtained with these alternative indicators suggests that the
3-bank ratio computed for the 1989{1996 period is a reliable indicator for our analysis.
8According to our data, the sector at the 25th percentile of the distribution of external nan-
cial dependence for young rms is Wood Products, while the sector at the 75th percentile is Metal
Products. Countries clustered at the 25th percentile of the distribution of the 3{bank concentration
ratio are Brazil, India, Philippines and Turkey, while countries at the 75th percentile are Costa Rica,
Pakistan, and Sweden. The analysis thus suggests that the Metal Products industry would grow 1.2
percentage points faster than the Wood Product industry, per year, in real terms in, say, Sweden as
compared to Turkey.
9For the calculation of the concentration dummy, countries were divided between those with a value
of the ratio below and those above a value equal to 0:70, which is what would be considered high
concentration, for example, in the U.S. banking industry (see e.g. Winer [31], Calem and Carlino [8]).
An alternative specication, which gave unchanged results and is not reported in the table, divided
the countries around the median of the distribution (0:57).
13In what follows we therefore present regression results using the 3-bank concentra-
tion ratio calculated over the 1989{1996 period as our benchmark indicator of banking
market structure.
6.2 Omitted variables
We test whether the term of interaction of bank concentration is signicant when we
omit the bank development interaction from the basic model specication. The results,
reported in column (a) of Table 5, show that the concentration variable remains positive
and signicant at the ten percent level.10
Subsequently, we check whether the bank concentration interaction variable is still
signicant after controlling for the relative importance of alternative sources of external
nance. To the basic specication of the model we add the interaction between external
dependence and the size of stock market capitalization over GDP. The coecient is
expected to have a positive sign. The results in Table 5, column (b) show that this
coecient is indeed positive, although not signicant. The bank concentration term
is still positive and signicant at the ve percent level, with an estimated coecient
close in magnitude to the one in the baseline regression (column (b), Table 4).
In column (c) of Table 5 we report the results of a regression where we add the
interaction between external dependence and the logarithm of income per capita in
1980. There is a general concern that the interaction term of bank development in our
basic specication may be proxying for the general level of economic development of a
country. The simple correlation between bank development and the income variable,
0:55 (reported in Table 3), may justify this concern. The coecient of the bank concen-
tration variable remains positive and is signicant at the ten percent level. Conrming
10We note a decrease in the estimated coecient, from 0:063 to 0:048. This is likely to be the
result of an omitted variable bias. Performing a bias analysis (see, e.g, Berndt [6, p. 322]) it is indeed
conrmed that the omission of the bank development variable determines a downward bias on the
coecient of bank concentration.
14the existence of some collinearity, the bank development and the income interaction
terms have the expected sign but neither is signicant.11
Finally, we add to the basic regression the interaction between external nancial
dependence and a measure of accounting standards, an index reﬂecting the standards
of disclosure of rms' annual reports (see Rajan and Zingales for details [25, p. 571]).
The poorer such standards, the higher the information cost that a bank has to sustain
to determine the quality of an entrepreneur. The theoretical argument for a positive
role of bank monopoly power for growth suggests that such a role would be especially
important if information costs were relevant. The expected sign for this term of in-
teraction is positive. Column (d) in Table 5 presents the results of this augmented
specication of the model. The coecient of bank concentration is still positive and
signicant, even though the size of the estimated coecient decreases from 0:063 to
0:032. The two coecients, however, are not immediately comparable. As one can
see from the table, by including the accounting standard variable the number of ob-
servations decreases substantially, from 1150 to 984. This is due to the fact that this
variable is missing for eight countries.12 Perhaps because of collinearity, the other two
terms of interaction in the regression have the expected sign but are not signicant.
6.3 Outliers
A general concern is that the results based on these growth regressions could be driven
by the exceptional performance of some countries (for example Southeast Asian coun-
11If we run a baseline regression where we replace the bank development interaction term with the
income level interaction term, the bank concentration variable maintains its sign, signicance and
magnitude as well.
12The eight countries are: Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
and Zimbabwe. If we run the baseline regression on the restricted sample excluding records for these
countries, the coecient of the bank concentration variable is equal to 0:042, signicant at the one
percent level. We choose to present our basic results based on the larger sample, in order to minimize
informational losses (8 countries out of 41 represent a rather signicant 20%). Moreover, since the 8
countries are all developing countries, we want to avoid sample bias.
15tries) or certain industrial sectors in particular countries, which could not be fully
captured by the inclusions of the country and sector indicator variables. This should
not aect our analysis, since the sample in the Rajan and Zingales data set does not
include countries such as Taiwan or Hong Kong. In addition, the series of growth in
value added censors from above sectors that, on average, grew more than 100 percent
annually in the 1980{1990 period. To be sure, we run a regression dropping the cen-
sored observations altogether.13 The results, reported in column (e) of Table 5, show
that the bank concentration variable becomes signicant at the 1 percent level, al-
though with a smaller coecient. The coecient of the bank development interaction,
signicant now at the 10 percent level only, decreases as well.
In addition, we evaluate whether the results are sensitive to high and low values
in the distribution of young rms' external nancial dependence. We use a dummy
variable to separate sectors above the median from those below the median of the
distribution of external nancial dependence and redened the bank concentration
interaction term accordingly. The results of this regression are reported in column (f)
of Table 5. They show that the interaction term is positive and highly signicant while
the dummy variable term is not signicantly dierent from zero. This is interpreted
as conrming that the eect of bank concentration is stable across the entire sample.
6.4 Tests on mature rms
As a nal round of exploration of the basic model specication, we investigate the role of
bank concentration for the nancial needs of the more mature rms in the data set, that
is establishments more than 10 years old. One may expect that relationship lending
would be less important for older, already well-established, rms. As we mentioned
earlier, the external nancial needs of this category of rms is indeed much lower than
13We thank Rob Bliss for suggesting this additional robustness test.
16for younger ones. Moreover, the problem of information acquisition on established
rms is less severe than for younger rms. Therefore, focusing specically on mature
rms, we might expect a less important, if not negative, eect of bank concentration
on industrial growth.
In the rst column of Table 6 we report the results of the basic specication, this
time calculating the terms of interaction using the external nancial dependence of
mature rms. The bank concentration term is still positive and signicant. However,
the eect on growth is half the size of that determined on young rms: the growth
dierential between an industrial sector at the 75th percentile and one at the 25th per-
centile of the distribution of external nancial dependence for mature rms, if we were
going from a country at the 25th percentile of the distribution of bank concentration,
to a country at the 75th percentile, is estimated to be about 0:5 percentage points on
an annual basis. As reported above, the growth dierential for young rms is instead
1:2 percentage points.
Among the mature rms, those that have already grown substantially and are well
established are likely to receive minor benets from a banking relationship, and are
therefore more likely to be exposed to the rent extraction activity of a concentrated
banking sector. Therefore, we performed an additional test on mature rms, splitting
the sample between those sectors in each country that had a share of value added in
manufacturing below and those above the country median. Columns (b) and (c) of
Table 6 report the results for the two subsets. The bank concentration interaction
term continues to be positive and signicant for the sectors below the median. For
sectors above the median the coecient is positive but no longer signicant.
In summary, bank concentration appears to have a positive eect on growth of sec-
tors that are more in need of external nance. Consistent with theory, the economic
impact is more pronounced for younger rms than for more mature ones. The domi-
nating positive eect of bank concentration seems to disappear only when we focus on
17a particular subset of the more mature rms.
7 Results from the extended model: First- and
second-order eects
In table 7 we report the results of regressions based on the specication in equation
(2), in which we add one control variable at a time. The dependent variable is growth
in value added, and external nancial dependence is that of the younger rms. The
country control variables are the logarithm of per capita income in 1980, stock market
capitalization over GDP in 1980, the accounting standards indicator, and a measure
of the level of human capital. The rst three variables were described earlier. The
level of human capital, another typical regressor in growth equations, is measured as
average number of school years in population over 25 (as in Barro and Lee [1]). Of
course, the level of bank development is an additional control variable itself.
All the control variables have the sign that one would expect to nd in any cross-
country growth equation.14 The main result to highlight is that bank concentration by
itself has a negative and signicant coecient, while the interaction term coecient
remains positive and signicant. The two eects of bank concentration are robust to
the inclusion of the various control variables.
The combined results, consistent with the theoretical priors, suggest that bank con-
centration has a direct negative eect on growth, which, on average, aects all sectors
and all rms indiscriminately. At the same time, there is a positive and substantial
eect of bank concentration through the role played in providing funds to rms in
those sectors that are more in need of external nance.
14We also ran a regression where we included external nancial dependence by itself as a regressor.
In order to do that, however, we had to exclude the industry indicator variables. Such regressor was
not signicant while all other coecients were unchanged.
18We evaluate the magnitude of the total, net eect of bank concentration on eco-
nomic growth. More precisely, we calculate the eect on growth evaluated at the mean
of the distribution of external nancial dependence for young rms, if we went from
a level of bank concentration at the 25th percentile to one at the 75th percentile of
the distribution.15 We perform this calculation based on the estimation results of the
regressions in columns (b) and (d) of Table 7. The one in the second column has
the highest number of controls that still allow the sample size to remain unchanged,
with 1150observations. The regression in the fourth column has the largest number
of controls but the inclusion of accounting standards and human capital among the
regressors brings the sample size down to 950 observations, with a loss of 9 of the
original countries in the data set.16 The net eect on growth based on the estimated
coecients in the second column regression is a negative 1:5 percentage points. The
eect based on the estimated coecients in the fourth column regression is instead a
negative 2:3 percentage points.17 We should not take these numbers at face value, since
the extended model specication is more exposed to a potential omitted variable bias,
due to the removal of the country-indicator variables. However, the overall evidence
suggests that the net eect is, on average, negative, but what also matters is that for
those sectors at the upper tail of the distribution of external nancial dependence for
young rms, the net eect is actually positive.18
We also add a squared term of bank concentration. As the results in column
(e) of Table 7 show, this term is positive and signicant, thus conrming that the
15The distribution of external nancial dependence for young rms has virtually identical mean and
median. The median is equal to 0.66 and the mean equal to 0.67.
16The inclusion of the human capital variable causes all records of one additional country, Egypt,
to be dropped. See comments in footnote 12.
17There is a substantial dierence in magnitude depending on which regression estimates we use.
However, if we calculate a 95% condence interval for the net eect on growth using either regression
estimates, we obtain virtually identical boundaries for both regressions, with estimated magnitudes
ranging between a negative 3:8{3:9 percentage points and a positive 0:8{0:9 percentage points.
18For example, based on the regression results in column (b), the net eect of bank concentration
would be positive for sectors such as Glass, Professional goods and Drugs.
19eect of bank concentration on industrial growth is non linear. Intuitively, at low
levels of concentration there is a maximum benet in that the deadweight loss from
rent extraction is minimal, but the potential informational gains from establishing
lending relationships are also minimal. Conversely, at high levels of concentration
the deadweight loss is high, but the benets from relationship lending are at their
maximum. There is an intermediate range of values of concentration that seems to
yield the worst scenario, since there is substantial rent extraction but banks do not
have enough market power to gain from relationship lending.
8 Renements
8.1 Market contestability
Concentration ratios are widely used in empirical analysis to proxy for rms' conduct.19
However, the potential weakness of this measure is that if markets are contestable,
market structure does not necessarily aect conduct. In a cross-country study, mar-
ket contestability can be gauged in terms of the ability of foreign banks to access
domestic markets. We can test whether the actual presence of foreign banks aects
the relationship between bank concentration and industry growth using data on the
share of total domestic assets owned by foreign banks (taken from Demirg¨ u c-Kunt
and Levine [13]), and on the fraction of foreign banks over the total number of banks
(taken from Claessens, Demirg¨ u c-Kunt and Huizinga [10]). Admittedly, such measures
may not capture the eect on the conduct of domestic banks of a potential threat of
entry, which is what contestability is more about. On the other hand \the threat of
19Recent developments in empirical industrial organization have proposed alternative measures
of market power, which could be used instead of the traditional concentration measures (see, e.g.,
Bresnahan [7]). Such measures are identied through econometric estimation of industry's demand
and supply conditions. The major drawback of such an alternative approach is the need for extensive
data, which is only available for the most developed countries.
20foreign bank entry may not be credible in the absence of actual entry" (Claessens,
Demirg¨ u c-Kunt and Huizinga [10, p. 7]).
Data show a limited presence of foreign banks in most of the countries in the sample.
For instance, the median share of assets owned by foreign banks is 6 percent (the 75th
percentile is 14 percent). At the same time, in terms of the number of foreign banks
over the total, perhaps a better indicator of the potentials for entry, the median fraction
is a more substantial 24 percent. The relatively low weight of foreign banks in most
countries may be due to the existence of administrative barriers to entry that were
or still are in place in developing countries, where hostility toward foreign institutions
could be traced back to the experience of colonialism (Vittas [30]). Such restrictions
are found in developed countries as well. For example, prior to 1993, countries that are
now members of the European Union signicantly restricted the entry of foreign banks.
Such restrictions are still in place with respect to banks from non-EU countries.20
We generate a dummy variable equal to one for countries with both a 3-bank ratio
and a foreign share of bank assets above their median. These are countries where,
given the relatively high presence of foreign banks, a high concentration ratio may
overestimate the actual degree of monopoly power. We run a baseline regression where
we add the product of the dummy with the concentration interaction term. The
results, in column (a) of Table 8, show that the concentration interaction alone is
still positive and signicant, while the dummy is not. This suggests that even if the
concentration indicator is biased upward in some countries, such bias is not driving
the main ndings.21
20One can also argue that besides regulatory restrictions, informational barriers play an important
role as well in preventing a banking market from being contestable. The existence of informational
barriers is discussed, and evidence is provided, e.g., in Berger et al. [5]. Some casual evidence is also
provided by the observation that despite the removal of the aforementioned regulatory barriers to
entry among EU countries, the actual presence of banks from other EU countries is still very limited,
averaging about 5 percent of total bank assets across country (ECB [14]).
21As an alternative test, we dropped the records for those countries altogether and ran a regression
on the restricted sample. We also repeated these tests with dierent cutos in the bank concentration
and foreign share distributions, and we also used the proportion of foreign banks in place of foreign
218.2 Under-reporting bias
We use data of foreign banking penetration to take into account another potential
source of bias in the concentration variable. As we described in section 4, the concen-
tration ratios are calculated using the IBCA data set. Such data set collects balance
sheet items for all banks that report such information. While the percentage of banks
reporting is very high, it is still possible to introduce a bias due to under-reporting.
In particular, Beck, Demirg¨ u c-Kunt and Levine [3] observe that \:::the concentra-
tion measure might be biased upwards for developing countries, if foreign and large
banks are more likely to report than domestic and smaller banks". To address this
problem, we generated a dummy variable equal to one for countries below the median
in per-capita GDP and above the median in the foreign bank share, in order to iso-
late those countries where the concentration indicator is more likely to be biased due
to under-reporting. We then ran regressions of the basic model specication, adding
the product of the dummy with the bank concentration interaction term. While the
bank concentration term alone remains signicant, the dummy term is not signicant,
suggesting that the under-reporting bias is not a problem (see column (b), Table 8).22
8.3 Using measures of bank eciency
We used interest margins and overhead costs as alternative indicators of bank conduct.
Using cross-country data from Demirg¨ u c-Kunt and Huizinga [12], we found that the
concentration indicator is not correlated with either variable. We ran regressions using
either one in place of bank concentration, but we did not nd signicant results. An
explanation is that bank conduct is what we are really trying to proxy for. However,
interest margins or overhead costs are measures of performance, which is determined
share. Similar tests of robustness were also performed on the extended model specication. The
results, available upon request, were in all instances qualitatively identical, indicating an eect of
bank concentration on industrial growth robust to the issue of market contestability.
22The same results were obtained using the proportion of foreign banks in place of foreign share.
22by structure and conduct, but also by other factors. In a cross-country analysis such
idiosyncratic factors are very likely to be important determinants of bank performance.
Hence, trying to trace back information on bank conduct via interest margins or over-
head costs is likely to yield spurious results. That is, a relatively higher margin in one
country does not necessarily imply relatively higher market power. Consistent with this
argument, Demirg¨ u c-Kunt and Huizinga [12] have performed a cross-country analysis
of interest margins and overhead costs and found that in fact country-specic factors
such as macroeconomic conditions, bank taxation, deposit insurance, legal structure,
and other institutional indicators are very important in their determination. They also
show that bank concentration, at cross-country level, is only mildly related to interest
margins and to overhead costs.
8.4 State-owned banks
Another potential criticism to our use of the concentration ratios is that in some
countries a large proportion of banks is owned by the government. In such cases,
where the same subject owns many banks, those banks might act as a cartel. As a
consequence, the concentration measure in some countries could underestimate the
actual market power. At the same time, it is also plausible to argue that public banks
may not necessarily be prot maximizers and may not have an incentive to establish
lending relationships with potentially protable enterprises.
Beck, Demirg¨ u c-Kunt and Levine [3] and Demirg¨ u c-Kunt and Levine [13] have
collected cross-country information on state ownership in the banking sector. We
generate a dummy variable equal to one if the share of state-owned banks is above a
certain threshold to single out countries with a signicant government presence in the
banking sector. Then we test for a non-linear response to the concentration interaction
term in the cases where state ownership is particularly high. The coecient of the
23product of the dummy and the concentration interaction term is negative, signicant
and almost the same in absolute value as the concentration interaction term alone
(column (c) in Table 8). Hence, the positive eect of bank concentration appears to
be oset in countries with a dominant government presence in the banking industry.
To explore further, we also run baseline regressions where we add the interaction
between external nancial dependence and state ownership. The concentration interac-
tion term is still signicant, with a slightly decreased coecient. The state ownership
interaction is negative and signicant (column (d) in Table 8). Interestingly enough,
in the extended model specication we also notice that the level of bank development
turns insignicant when we control for the degree of state ownership (column (e) in
Table 8).
8.5 Bank powers
The eect of bank monopoly power may dier depending on the regulatory environment
in which banks operate in a country. As we mentioned in section 1, if a bank were
allowed to nance rms through equity, then even under perfect competition it would
have an incentive to establish close relationships. Hence, in a world where banks are
less constrained in their nancing choices, we may expect the positive eect of banking
concentration on growth to be less important.
Barth, Caprio and Levine [2] compile information across countries on the restric-
tions for banks in terms of their ability to write contracts. They summarize this
information in a quantitative indicator ranging from 1 (broadest powers) to 4 (nar-
rowest powers). We add to the specication of the basic model an interaction between
this measure of bank powers and nancial dependence, and both bank powers alone
and the interaction to the extended model. In the basic model the bank concentration
interaction remains highly signicant, while the bank development interaction loses
24signicance. The bank powers interaction is not signicant (column (a) of Table 9).23
In the extended model both bank concentration alone and the interaction are highly
signicant while the bank powers variables are not signicant (column (b) of Table 9).
As an additional test on the extended model we also include an interaction of the
level of bank concentration with bank powers, to see if the rst-order negative eect
of concentration on industrial growth diers across countries with dierent regulatory
restrictions. The result (column (c), Table 9) shows that this interaction is negative and
signicant. In terms of magnitude, however, the total rst-order eect is unchanged.24
Nevertheless, this is a renement of our analysis. Specically, the result suggests that
the deadweight loss from bank concentration is strongest in countries with the most
constrained regulatory environment.
8.6 Endogeneity
In light of our results, one could argue that bank concentration could endogenously
adjust to a level optimal for each country's industrial structure. However, this consid-
eration overlooks the fact that there are political and institutional factors that distort
the natural development of nancial systems. Interest groups, or governments, or both,
will shape the legal, institutional and economic environment for private gains that may
not necessarily coincide with the proper development, in terms of both size and struc-
ture, of the nancial industry.25 Moreover, even with the best intentions, the market
structure of the banking sector is a favorite policy variable for reasons not necessarily
23We also generate a dummy variable equal to 1 if bank powers are very broad (below the me-
dian). We then add the product of the dummy and the concentration-dependence interaction to the
regression. This new term is also not signicant.
24The coecient of bank concentration alone goes from -0.08 to -0.04, but adding the product of the
coecient of the interaction between concentration and bank powers with the mean of bank powers,
2.5, we are back to approximately -0.08.
25Rajan and Zingales [26] extensively elaborate on this argument.
25related to industry growth.26 Hence, the objective function of the regulator is such
that the \optimal" level of bank concentration may be unrelated to that requested by
the industry structure of the economy.
Beyond this line of arguments, we address the issue of endogeneity using instru-
mental variables estimation. We begin by noticing that bank concentration should be
negatively correlated with market size. As a proxy of market size we use total GDP
(in US dollars) and conrm the existence of a negative and signicant correlation with
bank concentration (we also use population and geographical size as alternative prox-
ies, with similar results). Then we use the market size variable as an instrument,
nding that the concentration interaction term is still positive and signicant.27 This
result is reported in column (d) of Table 9.
8.7 Does bank concentration lead to industry concentration?
Another relevant issue is whether bank concentration causes nancially-dependent in-
dustries to become concentrated, thus enabling rms to earn monopoly prots (banks
may act as a barrier to entry by privileging incumbents|with whom they already
established relationships|over new entrants).28 Since we measure industrial growth
in terms of value added, under such scenario we could observe positive growth due
to an increase in prots and not necessarily in production, with important welfare
implications.
The Rajan and Zingales data set contains information on growth in the number
26For example, the regulator often controls competition in the banking industry to prevent excessive
surplus extraction or for reasons related to the safety and soundness of the industry.
27We also tested that bank concentration is not just capturing a market size eect by adding to
the basic model regression an interaction between total GDP and external nancial dependence. The
results, not reported in the paper, show bank concentration still signicant while the market size
interaction term not signicant.
28In his study of Italian industrialization at the turn of the past century, Cohen [11] reports the
relation between a quasi-monopolistic banking industry and \...the emergence of concentration of
ownership and control in the new and rapidly growing sectors of the industrial structure" (page 363).
26of establishments and growth in the average size of existing establishments that can
be used to test this hypothesis. If bank concentration induces industry concentration,
and thus industry monopoly prots, we should nd a negative relationship between
the concentration-dependence interaction and growth in the number of establishments
in those sectors that are more dependent on external nance. By the same token, we
should nd a positive association with growth in the average size of existing establish-
ments.
We run regressions with growth in number of establishments as the dependent
variable in both model specications. The results in column (e) of Table 9 show that the
concentration-dependence interaction is positive, but not signicant in the basic model
specication. Column (f) shows that the interaction is positive and signicant in the
extended model specication and the level of concentration is negative and signicant.
We calculate the net magnitude eect on growth in the number of establishments
of going from a country at the 25th percentile to one at the 75th percentile in the
distribution of bank concentration. For the sectors that are more nancially dependent
the net eect is positive.
We then use growth in average size as the dependent variable. The results of these
regressions are reported in columns (g) and (h) of Table 9. In both model specications
the interaction term is never signicant. In the extended model the level of bank
concentration is negative and signicant. Overall, the evidence does not support the
argument that bank concentration may enhance industry concentration. The results
also provide support for the contention that growth in value added is a good proxy for
growth in output.
279 Concluding remarks and policy implications
Important recent contributions have established with reasonable condence that -
nancial development, characterized by a sizeable banking sector, matters for economic
growth. The next important step in the research agenda involves delving deeper into
the micro details governing the actual functioning of the nance-growth nexus: beyond
a \black-box" characterization of the banking sector, implicit in focusing on its relative
size only, there is a much more complex web of banking institutions interacting in the
credit markets. The various attributes of such a system are likely to have a qualify-
ing impact on the nance-growth relationship. The market structure of the banking
industry, reﬂecting its competitive conditions, is in our opinion one such attributes.
The ndings in our paper suggest a non-trivial impact of bank concentration on
industrial growth. There is evidence that bank concentration has a rst-order negative
eect on growth. This nding is consistent with the theoretical prediction that higher
bank concentration results, on average, in a lower amount of credit available to rms.
However, we also nd evidence that bank concentration has a heterogeneous eect
across industries. In particular, sectors that are more dependent on external nance
enjoy a benecial eect from a concentrated banking sector, which could actually more
than compensate the direct, negative eect on quantities. This nding supports models
predicting that concentration of market power in banking facilitates the development
of lending relationships, which have in turn an enhancing eect on rms' growth.
The ndings suggest several important policy considerations. The rst one is that,
at least maintaining the focus on the eects on industrial growth, there does not seem
to be a Pareto-dominant policy regarding the optimal banking market structure: com-
petition in banking does not necessarily dominate monopoly, and vice versa. Second,
regulation of the nancial industry is intimately related to industrial policy. As we
have shown, depending on the level of concentration of the banking industry, ceteris
28paribus, individual sectors will grow at dierent speeds. Therefore, banking market
structure plays an important role in shaping the cross-industry size distribution within
a country. Related to this consideration, since bank concentration plays a more sub-
stantial role for growth by facilitating credit access of younger rms, and to the extent
that investment by younger rms is more likely to introduce innovative technologies,
regulators face an unexpected trade-o between the generally desirable eects of bank
competition and the promotion of technological progress.
Additional policy implications follow from some of the renements in section 8.
We gain important policy insights, for example, from the analysis of the role of the
government in the banking sector. If the results of this paper suggest a positive role
of bank concentration for the development of certain industrial sectors, we also see
that such role disappears in countries with a signicant proportion of state-owned
banks. An additional policy implication, with a broader scope than the one of the
paper, is that actually even the mere size of the banking sector loses importance for
economic growth. None of these results thus support the implementation of policies of
\nationalization" of the banking industry.
Similarly relevant is the insight we can gain on the indirect role of regulatory
restrictions on banks' activity for economic growth. The results from the data suggest
that broadening bank powers, thus allowing them to write equity contracts and to own
non-nancial rms, does not seem to diminish the importance of bank concentration
to establish lending relationships, while it reduces banks rent extraction ability. If the
policy maker intends to enhance the growth of sectors highly dependent on external
nance, then a proper combination of regulatory measures would be to favor bank
concentration and expand bank powers. A more thorough exploration of these issues,
however, goes beyond the scope of the paper and is left for future research.
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33Table 1: List of Countries and Bank Concentration Ratios
Country 3-Bank 5-Bank Country 3-Bank 5-Bank
Australia 0.60 0.80 Korea 0.28 0.44
Austria 0.42 0.55 Malaysia 0.44 0.54
Bangladesh 0.62 0.75 Mexico 0.53 0.66
Belgium 0.49 0.73 Morocco 0.57 0.79
Brazil 0.40 0.50 Netherlands 0.77 0.88
Canada 0.57 0.84 New Zealand 0.75 0.99
Chile 0.45 0.62 Norway 0.60 0.74
Colombia 0.35 0.54 Pakistan 0.71 0.90
Costa Rica 0.71 0.82 Peru 0.64 0.76
Denmark 0.74 0.82 Philippines 0.40 0.56
Egypt 0.58 0.73 Portugal 0.46 0.63
Finland 0.85 0.98 Singapore 0.61 0.83
France 0.28 0.44 South Africa 0.69 0.90
Germany 0.27 0.39 Spain 0.34 0.50
Greece 0.79 0.91 Sri Lanka 0.75 0.89
India 0.40 0.51 Sweden 0.71 0.94
Israel 0.79 0.94 Turkey 0.41 0.56
Italy 0.24 0.38 United Kingdom 0.50 0.65
Japan 0.21 0.32 United States 0.15 0.20
Jordan 0.87 0.94 Venezuela 0.47 0.62
Kenya 0.59 0.72 Zimbabwe 0.78 0.97
NOTE: For each country we calculated the sum of market shares (measured in total assets) of the
three and the ve largest banks. The data on individual banking institutions for each country in the
sample, are from the IBCA-BankScope 1997 CD for the period 1989{1996. The values reported are
averages over the sample period. Note that data about the United States are not used in any of the
regressions; we report them only for sake of completeness.
34Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Data Set
Variable Num. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth in value addedj 1150 0.036 0.092 -0.447 1.000
Growth in average sizej 1100 0.020 0.102 -0.093 0.410
Growth in numberj 1169 0.014 0.079 -0.414 0.944
Fraction of value addedj;k 1191 0.015 0.021 0.000 0.224
3 − bank ratiok 1333 0.552 0.180 0.210 0.870
5 − bank ratiok 1333 0.705 0.186 0.320 0.990
External dependence allj 1333 0.348 0.379 -0.146 1.491
External dependence youngj 1333 0.671 0.633 -1.534 2.058
External dependence oldj 1293 0.022 0.300 -1.330 0.394
Accounting standardsk 1082 0.612 0.134 0.240 0.830
Bank developmentk 1333 0.376 0.198 0.069 0.856
Log per capita GDP1980;k 1333 7.868 1.334 4.793 9.572
Stock market capitalization1980;k=GDP1980;k 1333 0.204 0.300 0.000 1.624
Human capital1980;k 1279 6.050 2.812 1.681 12.140
Interest margink 1442 3.889 2.419 1.400 13.600
Overhead costsk 1442 3.654 2.208 1.300 10.200
Bank powersk 1363 2.171 0.642 1.000 3.500
Foreign bank sharek 1283 0.116 0.147 0.000 0.620
No: of foreign banks1980;k 1479 0.258 0.187 0.000 0.850
State sharek 1011 0.334 0.325 0.000 0.980
Population1997;k 1584 71.545 149.282 3.000 962
Surfacek 1584 1326.462 2494.251 1.000 9971
Total GDP1997;k 1584 585.202 1378.334 4.000 7783
Growth in value added is the average (compounded) rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each of the countries between
1980 and 1990. Growth in the average size of rms is growth in the ratio of value added to the number of rms. The fraction of value added
is industry j's share of manufacturing value added in country k; 3-bank and 5-bank are the concentration ratios of the banking sector of each
country as explained in table 1; external nancial dependence measures refer respectively to the borrowing needs of all establishments (all), of
establishments less than ten years old (young), and of establishments ten years and older (old). Accounting standards is an index ranking the
amount of disclosure of companies' annual reports for each country. Bank development is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. Human
capital is the average for 1980 of the years of school attained by the population over 25 years of age. Interest margin is banks' net interest income
divided by total assets (1988{95). Overhead costs is the ratio of banks' overhead costs to total assets (1988{95). Bank powers is a measure of
regulatory restrictions on bank activities in the 1990s. Foreign bank share is the ratio of foreign bank assets to total bank assets (1988{95). Number
of foreign banks is the ratio of the number of foreign banks to the total number of banks (1988{95). State share is the share of assets of state-owned
banks over total commercial bank assets. Total GDP is in 1997 US dollars calculated using the World Bank Atlas method.
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5Table 3: Correlations between Concentration Indicators and Selected Variables
Variables Stock GDP Accounting Bank 3 − Bank 5 − Bank
Stock market1980;k=GDP1980;k 1.000
Log per capita GDP1980;k 0.160* 1.000
Accounting standardsk 0.441* 0.573* 1.000
Bank developmentk 0.174* 0.553* 0.243* 1.000
3 − bank ratiok 0.177* -0.092 0.182* -0.228* 1.000
5 − bank ratiok 0.242* -0.048* 0.235* -0.264* 0.970* 1.000
Variables Interest Overhead State Foreign Powers 3 − bank
Interest margink 1.000
Overhead costsk 0.847* 1.000
State ownershipk 0.066 0.098 1.000
Foreign presencek 0.245* 0.395* -0.023 1.000
Bank powersk 0.352* 0.317* -0.049 0.240* 1.000
3 − bank ratiok 0.024 -0.020 -0.132* 0.125* -0.250* 1.000
NOTE: An asterisk indicates that the correlation is dierent from zero at the 1% signicance level.
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6Table 4: Bank Concentration, Young Firms' Financial Needs, and Growth in Value Added
Rajan-Zingales 3-Bank Rank High/Low 5-Bank
Regressors (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fraction of value addedj;k -0.904*** -0.905*** -0.906*** -0.903*** -0.903***
(0.286) (0.285) (0.285) (0.286) (0.285)
External dependencej  Bank developmentk 0.034* 0.049** 0.046** 0.031* 0.045**
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021)
External dependencej  Bank concentrationk 0.063** 0.088** 0.019* 0.085**
(0.029) (0.041) (0.010) (0.035)
R2 0.283 0.288 0.287 0.286 0.288
Observations 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150
NOTE: The dependent variable in all regressions is the average (compounded) rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each
of the countries between 1980 and 1990. The fraction of value added is industry j's share of manufacturing value added in country k;e x t e r n a l
nancial dependence refers to the borrowing needs of establishments less than ten years old. Banking development is the ratio of private domestic
credit to GDP. Column (a) reproduces one of the original regressions from Rajan and Zingales. Column (b) uses the 3-bank ratio (as dened in
the text) as a measure of banking concentration. In column (c) bank concentration is the rank of the 3-bank ratio, column (d) uses a high-low
concentration dummy, while column (e) has the 5-bank concentration ratio. The high-low dummy is equal to one for the countries with a high
value of concentration ( 0:7) and zero otherwise. Alternative estimation, with the dummy for countries below or above the median (0:57), yielded
virtually unchanged results and is not reported in the table. Other regressors included are country indicators and industry indicators, but we do not
report their coecient estimates. Other regressors included are country indicators and industry indicators, but we do not report their coecient
estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk states that the variable is signicant at the 10%
level, two asterisks indicate signicance at the 5% level, and three asterisks indicate 1% signicance level.
3
7Table 5: Tests of Robustness
Introducing more regressors Outliers
Regressors (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Fraction of value addedj;k -0.887*** -0.914*** -0.905*** -0.296** -0.816*** -0.905***
(0.287) (0.286) (0.285) (0.147) (0.260) (0.286)
External dependencej  Bank developmentk 0.045** 0.028 0.005 0.033* 0.049**
(0.022) (0.030) (0.012) (0.017) (0.023)
External dependencej  Bank concentrationk 0.048* 0.059** 0.058* 0.035** 0.036*** 0.076***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.014) (0.014) (0.028)
External dependencej  Stock market1980;k=GDP1980;k 0.012
(0.010)
External dependencej  Log of per capita GDP1980;k 0.005
(0.005)
External dependencej  Accounting Standardsk 0.032
(0.022)
Highj  External dependencej  Bank concentrationk -0.017
(0.038)
R2 0.284 0.288 0.289 0.416 0.327 0.288
Observations 1150 1150 1150 984 1148 1150
NOTE: The dependent variable in all regressions is the average (compounded) rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each
country between 1980 and 1990. The fraction of value added is industry j's share of manufacturing in country k; external nancial dependence
refers to the borrowing needs of establishments less than ten years old. Banking development is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP.
Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio. Accounting standards is an index ranking the amount of disclosure of companies' annual reports for
each country. Because of missing values in accounting standards, the inclusion of accounting standards in column (d) causes all records referring
to the following countries to be dropped: Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. Column (e)
is our baseline regression (as in column (b) of table 4), but we exclude the observations where the dependent variable was censored at growth
= 100% per year. The regression in column (f) includes High, a dummy variable equal to one when a sector's external nancial need is above
the median (0:60). Other regressors included are country indicators and industry indicators, but we do not report their coecient estimates.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk states that the variable is signicant at the 10% level, two
asterisks indicate signicance at the 5% level, and three asterisks indicate 1% signicance level.
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8Table 6: Regressions with Financial Needs of Old Establishments
All rms Above median Below median
Regressors (a) (b) (c)
Fraction of value addedj;k -0.898*** -0.661*** -5.945***
(0.282) (0.235) (1.790)
External dependencej  Bank developmentk 0.114*** 0.303*** 0.091**
(0.037) (0.108) (0.045)
External dependencej  Bank concentrationk 0.100** 0.023 0.120*
(0.048) (0.090) (0.066)
R2 0.282 0.507 0.351
Observations 1112 535 577
NOTE: The dependent variable in all regressions is the average (compounded) rate of growth of real
value added for each industrial sector in each country between 1980 and 1990. In all regressions,
the fraction of value added is industry j's share of manufacturing in country k; external nancial
dependence refers to the borrowing needs of establishments more than ten years old. Bank devel-
opment is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. Bank concentration is the 3-bank ratio. The
rst column is a regression of the entire sample; the second regression only considers sectors whose
share of value added in manufacturing in their country is above the median, while the third column
reports a regression of sectors whose share of value added is below the median. Other regressors in-
cluded are country indicators and industry indicators, but we do not report their coecient estimates.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk states that
the variable is signicant at the 10% level, two asterisks indicate signicance at the 5% level, and
three asterisks indicate 1% signicance level.
39Table 7: Estimation of the Total Effect of Bank Concentration on Industrial Growth
Regressors (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fraction of value addedj;k -0.888*** -0.889*** -0.398*** -0.337** -0.354**
(0.260) (0.259) (0.138) (0.136) (0.138)
Bank developmentk 0.043** 0.035* 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.045**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
External dependencej  Bank developmentk 0.047** 0.047** 0.012 0.007 0.007
(0.024) (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Bank concentrationk -0.077*** -0.088*** -0.079*** -0.105*** -0.347***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.072)
Squared bank concentrationk 0.225***
(0.065)
External dependencej  Bank concentrationk 0.059** 0.060** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.041***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Log of per capita GDP1980;k -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Stock market capitalization1980;k=GDP1980;k 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Accounting standardsk 0.067*** 0.119*** 0.110***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.028)
Human capitalk 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.133 0.144 0.204 0.232 0.238
Observations 1150 1150 984 950 950
NOTE: The dependent variable in all columns is the average (compounded) rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each
country between 1980 and 1990. The fraction of value added is industry j's share of manufacturing in country k; external nancial dependence
refers to the borrowing needs of establishments less than ten years old. Bank development is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. Bank
concentration is the 3-bank ratio. Human capital is the average for 1980 of the years of school attained by the population over 25 years of age.
As mentioned in the note to table 5, missing values in the accounting standards variable restrict our sample when such variable is used as a
regressor (the countries that are dropped are: Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe). Similarly,
the inclusion of the measure of human capital implies that records about Egypt are dropped from the sample. This explains the dierence in the
number of observations. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Industry indicator variables are included in
all regressions, but we do not report their coecient estimates. Note that country indicator variables are not included in these regressions. One
asterisk states that the variable is signicant at the 10% level, two asterisks indicate signicance at the 5% level, and three asterisks indicate 1%
signicance level.
4
0Table 8: Refinements: Contestability, Under-Reporting, and State Ownership
Contestability Under-reporting State ownership
Regressors (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fraction of value addedj;k -0.802** -0.810** -1.003*** -1.008*** -0.371***
(0.335) (0.334) (0.364) (0.366) (0.137)
Ext: dep:j  Bank developmentk 0.030* 0.022 0.046* 0.034 0.011
(0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020)
Ext: dep:j  Bank concentrationk 0.044** 0.037** 0.048*** 0.035** 0.041***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Bank concentrationk -0.060***
(0.015)
High Foreign&High Bk: Conc:k  Ext: dep:j -0.015
(0.027)
High Foreign&High P:C: GDPk  Ext: dep:j -0.020
(0.027)
High Statek  Ext: dep:j -0.056**
(0.025)




Observations 952 952 741 741 635
R2 0.253 0.253 0.238 0.236 0.173
NOTE: The dependent variable in all columns is the average (compounded) rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each
country between 1980 and 1990. The fraction of value added is industry j's share of manufacturing in country k; external nancial dependence
refers to the borrowing needs of establishments less than ten years old. Bank development is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. Bank
concentration is the 3-bank ratio. High Foreign&High Bank Concentration is a dummy variable equal to one for countries with both a 3-bank
ratio and a foreign share of bank assets above their median. High Foreign&High per-capita GDP is a dummy variable equal to one for countries
below the median in per-capita GDP and above the median in the foreign bank share. State measures the share of assets of state-owned banks
over total commercial bank assets. High State is a dummy variable equal to one if the share of state-owned banks is above 60%. Industry- and
country-indicator variables are included in columns (a) through (d), but we do not report their coecient estimates. In column (e) per-capita
GDP, stock market capitalization, accounting standards, and bank development are used as country controls (because the country indicators are
excluded), but we do not report their estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. One asterisk states that
the variable is signicant at the 10% level, two asterisks indicate signicance at the 5% level, and three asterisks indicate 1% signicance level.
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1Table 9: Refinements: Endogeneity, Industry Concentration, and Bank Powers
Bank powers IV Growth in No. Growth avg. size
Regressors (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Fraction of value addedj;k -0.360** -0.400*** -0.413*** -0.906*** -0.14 0.012 -0.876** -0.564**
(0.146) (0.139) (0.139) (0.285) (0.165) (0.126) (0.379) (0.240)
External dependencej  Bank developmentk 0.012 0.011 0.018 0.057** 0.029** 0.022 0.005 -0.008
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021)
External dependencej  Bank concentrationk 0.039*** 0.039** 0.045*** 0.097*** 0.022 0.035* 0.02 0.001
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.034) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020)
Bank concentrationk -0.081*** -0.048** -0.035* -0.050**
(0.016) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020)




Bank concentrationk  Bank Powersk -0.020*
(0.012)
Observations 1035 984 984 1150 1015 892 991 876
R2 0.381 0.205 0.207 0.287 0.443 0.119 0.42 0.217
NOTE: The dependent variable in columns (a) through (d) is the average (compounded) rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector
in each country between 1980 and 1990. The dependent variable in columns (e){(f) is growth in number of rms, and in columns (g){(h) is growth
in average rm size. The fraction of value added is industry j's share of manufacturing in country k; external nancial dependence refers to the
borrowing needs of establishments less than ten years old. Bank development is the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. Bank concentration
is the 3-bank ratio. Bank powers is a measure of regulatory restrictions on bank activities in the 1990s. Column (d) is an instrumental-variables
estimation, where total GDP is the instrument for bank concentration. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Industry- and country-indicator variables are included in columns (a), (d), (e), and (g), but we do not report their coecient estimates. In columns
(b), (c), (f), and (h), per-capita GDP, stock market capitalization, accounting standards, and bank development are used as country controls
(because the country indicators are excluded), but we do not report their estimates. One asterisk states that the variable is signicant at the 10%
level, two asterisks indicate signicance at the 5% level, and three asterisks indicate 1% signicance level.
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